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There has been concern that artificial intelligence may cause significant unemployment, but 
proponents say that AI augments jobs. Both of these positions have substance, but there is a 
need to articulate the mechanisms by which AI may actually do both, and in the process, 
transform the balance of work available. We examine economic studies of automation’s 
impact on employment and skills, illustrating the favouring of nonroutine skills over the 
routine, and a hollowing-out of middle skill jobs. We then use case evidence of AI and 
automation to show how AI is augmenting automation to the same effect, allowing firms to 
modularize and control routine work. The remaining work tends to be nonroutine and low 
skilled (allowing for further replacement in the future), or high skilled. We illustrate the 
dynamic effects that occur when AI is combined with other key technologies, creating 
economies of scale and scope for firms. Through augmentation, the resulting employment 
structures may also have lower quantities of high skilled work. This depends on advances in 
AI, and its ability to replace more complex forms of work. We end with a call for more 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been great concern about Artificial Intelligence’s (AI’s) effect on 
employment. Observers have spawned concerns in the general public about which kinds of 
jobs and skills will be replaced, as well as discussed on how jobs could be transformed, and 
what new skills would be needed to work in this new ‘Age’. Two views have emerged: the 
‘replacement’ and ‘augmentation’ views. The research and evidence are usually based on cases 
and anecdotes, or assumptions that are skewed towards a particular view (e.g. of the 
technology’s potential). Early studies promoted the ‘replacement’ view by showing that AI had 
a great potential to reduce employment in many categories (Frey and Osborne, 2017). Recently 
however, a slate of opinions from industry and business scholars have advocated an 
augmentation view in which AI complements human work, and in which humans have to 
upgrade their skills in order to fit in with the emerging work environments (Daugherty and 
Wilson, 2018; Davenport and Dreyer, 2018). Although both the arguments on replacement and 
augmentation are based on the technology’s potential, they vary on their view of what happens 
to the work, since the augmentation view sees the core work tasks as being enhanced, while 
the replacement view sees the core tasks being replaced by automation. In practice, the 
technology complements and substitutes for skills, and the net balance depends on how the 
organization wields the two together. Indeed, Raisch and Krakowski (2020) recently argued 
for a more nuanced balance between the two perspectives, and on what organizations can do 
to mitigate the negative effects of AI as they embrace the positive effects.  
Our view is that the business and economic perspectives have not been considered as 
well, and especially the dynamic effects. In this paper, to better understand how work may be 
replaced or transformed, we explore how AI is being used to enhance the automation of work 
and of organizations as a whole, and how this may create competitive advantages over time, as 
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well as impacts to selected types of employment.1 We will examine this with the use of 
examples from an extreme form of organization that is emerging - the digitally transformed 
firm - and its use of AI to automate the firm. To start off, in section two, we examine the 
literature on industrialization and employment. Economic studies show that as automation and 
information technology (IT) increased productivity, they tend to favour nonroutine skills and 
jobs, displacing routine work, and leading to shifts in employment structures. In section three, 
we develop a basis for understanding how newer AI technologies could displace routinized 
work. Using recent examples, we illustrate how “digitally transforming” organizations are 
embedding AI in a broader automation of work. In section 4, we account for the dynamic 
effects of this digital transformation on organizational competitiveness. When prospecting how 
further dynamics may play out, we consider how the combination of AI with other technologies 
creates additional capabilities for “digitally transformed” firms. These capabilities can create 
economies of scale and scope for the organization, and under certain conditions, can lead firms 
to favor employment structures with lesser amounts of skilled routine work, and more highly 
technical skilled work (albeit with smaller-sized teams).  
Augmentation and Replacement  
The recent debate about augmentation and replacement has stemmed from different 
perspectives in the literature. Inferring what AI could do across various occupational 
classifications defined by discrete tasks, a well-known study by Frey and Osborne (2017) found 
 
1 To broaden the scope of and balance our investigation, we examined not only the augmentation view (as seen in 
Raisch and Krakowski, 2020), but also studies of the replacement view (e.g. Ford, 2015; Susskind and Susskind, 
2015), some of which straddle the middle-ground. We also review economic studies on employment, 
technological developments, and secondary cases on industry to help theorize on AI’s implications. One feature 
of our approach is its dynamic view of technological and organizational evolution, as seen recently in another 
view of AI in organizations (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2020). 
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that 47 percent of US employment could be at risk from AI (though much of it could have also 
involved the automation of tasks).2 These studies were based on experts’ assessment of whether 
the technology could replace tasks tied to occupational categories, based on how routine and 
replicable by machines (i.e. AI) the work could be.  
Most recently, the opposing view has been put forward that AI augments jobs and tasks 
(Barro and Davenport, 2019; Raisch and Krakowski; 2020; Tarafdar et al, 2019). Many 
contemporary AI firms describe their products as improving productivity by removing routine 
and ‘unnecessary’ tasks within specific domains. Increasingly, AI has been used to tackle 
narrowly-scoped functions and tasks, ranging from market research to medical and financial 
domains. Many applications involve statistical data, but increasingly, other kinds of data, 
including images, are handled. While early companies often offered technology in search of a 
solution, the current trend has AI companies targeting specific tasks within a workflow, such 
as Cyft (which focuses on healthcare interventions), Uptake (which integrates the Internet of 
Things (IoT) and AI for industrial automation) and Numerai (which combines AI with 
blockchain technology). To exploit these deeper niche markets, the AI applications need to 
incorporate domain knowledge from experts. Deep learning also requires significant amounts 
of data for training. Increasingly, AI product firms also note that they are building platforms 
that clients can use to enhance work productivity, and increasingly, to integrate work activities. 
Recent academic views also embrace this augmentation view by emphasizing how AI enhances 
 
2 Other studies follow the same tradition with the same type of data and methodology, e.g. Felten et al (2018) 
examined the impact of AI with the O*NET occupational database, which provides detail by tasks accomplished 
across a variety of occupations. In general, proponents of replacement note that advances in AI have the potential 
to disrupt much of the remaining human employment untouched from previous automation technologies, 
including manual occupations, services work, and back office functions. For instance, a number of driving 
occupations are at risk of disappearing (Ford, 2015).  
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personal efficiency or productivity (Agrawal, et al 2018; Barro and Davenport, 2019; 
Daugherty and Wilson, 2018). Since such views are often based on a narrow view of 
technology itself (usually focused on deep learning), and anecdotal evidence on the AI 
augmentation of tasks, they do not capture the potential changes to organizational capabilities 
and their employment structures.  
2. Past Perspectives on Technology and Employment 
A History of Productivity Increases 
While replacement view studies of AI’s impacts on employment rely on experts to assess the 
technology’s potential impact in the future, we can examine historical periods for confirmation 
of an actual impact. The issue of technology’s effects on employment have been a long-
standing preoccupation. While technology has historically been considered a major force in 
transforming societies, studies of significant periods of industrialization show that the 
introduction of key technologies took years to impact on economic growth and productivity 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996; Brynjolfsson et al, 2017; David, 1989). In part, this is due to the 
time needed for firms to transform themselves organizationally to take advantage of the 
technology.  In many manufacturing sectors that saw significant automation in the 1980s, 
innovations such as flexible manufacturing systems and computer-integrated manufacturing 
reshaped both practices and skills. Manufacturing jobs were transformed into a mix of high 
and low skilled jobs, with many low skilled (typically manual) jobs being removed. Economic 
studies showed a mixed effect on jobs, as while some jobs were replaced by automation, new 
jobs were also created in other sectors. This could partly be attributed to automation creating 
new functions, and partly to the economies’ move to a service or information economy (OECD, 
2018).  
When technology fosters productivity, the replacement or displacement of labor 
follows suit from those gains (Dedrick et al, 2003; Dewan and Min, 1997). In studies of the 
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broader economy-wide impact of automation, routine work was the first to be automated and 
displaced (where economic studies typically categorized work into the dimensions of routine 
versus non-routine, and cognitive versus manual [Autor et al, 2003; Jaimovich and Siu, 
2020]). 3  In addition to the ongoing automation of manufacturing, leaps in information 
technology during the 1990s also increased labor productivity in office environments. In the 
last few decades, administrative, secretarial and other routine jobs have been replaced by 
automation (Carbonero et al, 2018; Susskind and Susskind, 2015; Winick, 2017).4 While as a 
whole, the loss of jobs is offset by the addition of jobs in other sectors (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 
2018), much of the new work is not of the same income (Autor et al 2006). Computer-based 
automation is recognized for not only causing the loss of middle-income routinized jobs, but 
also for polarizing jobs into high and low waged jobs at the expense of middle-income ones 
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2019). These job polarisation studies describe the phenomena as the 
“hollowing out of the middle-paid, middle-skilled jobs in developed countries” (Nedelkoska 
and Quintini, 2018). While both anecdotal and sectoral evidence suggest that automation has 
displaced human work in the past (Susskind and Susskind 2015), economic studies also showed 
that automation impacted routine manufacturing and other jobs more than nonroutine ones in 
past eras (Autor et al, 2006). In a recent study of “jobless recoveries” (based on data up to just 
 
3 The routine, manual category refers to lower skill jobs, e.g. service occupations in the fast food industry. In 
contrast, the non-routine cognitive category refers to higher end analytical and other intellectual work, involving 
flexibility, problem-solving, and human interaction skills. In this framing, the occupational categories involving 
such work involve professionalized college degrees and occupations relating to management, business, and 
financial operations, as well as in professional and related occupations.  
4 While initial studies in the 1990s based on data from the 1980s did not yield a strong relationship between IT 
investments and productivity growth, later studies and meta-analyses concluded otherwise, in part because firms 
needed time to redesign their organizations and processes to take advantage of the new technologies. A similar 
effect is expected in the AI era (Brynjolfsson et al, 2017).  
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after the 2009 recovery), Jaimovich and Siu (2020) show that even the category of routine, 
cognitive work did not fully recover to their former numbers after the downturn. The broad 
trajectory of this is to be expected, given that firms will generally seek to routinize work. 
However, with advances in AI, some “nonroutine” cognitive work has also been shown to be 
replicable by AI, suggesting that previously untouched work may have risks of replacement in 
the future. Since historically, new sectors and jobs were also created in the wake of 
technological disruptions, the usual policy response involves creating workforce training 
programs to help displaced employees to seek new work (Illanes et al, 2018). However, 
workforce training was known to have mixed results in the past, and those who retrain may not 
get work that is comparable to the lost work (p. 11, Government Accountability Office, 2011). 
Furthermore, studies suggest that those on the lower-skilled end of routine manual work are 
unlikely to migrate upwards to the “cognitive” categories of work (Jaimovich and Siu, 2020). 
It should no longer be taken as a given that sufficient numbers of well-paying jobs can be 
created to replace future lost jobs.  
The Transformation of Skills in Automation Eras  
It is well-known that as new technologies transform work, they also change the skills required 
of tasks. The argument is that by making routine tasks “general purpose”, information and 
communication technology allows better-skilled people to “make more creative and more 
productive use of it” (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018). This suggests that the remaining higher-
skilled work is cognitively demanding, if not irreplaceable. However, job polarization studies 
suggest that while some of the remaining non-automated work are of the higher-skilled variety, 
other remaining work is of a more manual (nonroutine) variety. An opposing view in the 1980s 
held that the transformed manufacturing work was actually deskilled. The argument was that 
the tacit nature of human machinery operation was now replaced by the human operation of 
computerized machinery utilizing digital interfaces (Form, 1987; Zuboff, 1988). This has 
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implications for the current debate on AI, since this itself is a procedural, and thus potentially 
automatable type of activity. In fact, many of the tasks that modern AI replaces in the realm of 
“cognitive work” were once tacit human tasks that have been reframed as pattern recognition 
problems solvable by AI.  
There is still intellectually demanding work to be done. A large part of this occurs on 
the back end, involving the likes of programmers, data scientists, and “augmented” analytical 
tasks as found in marketing and other functions. As with manual work, when organizations 
shed labor to reduce costs and increase efficiency, not all of the “complementary” work that 
remains is rigorous, and the work that remains only does so because the AI cannot yet replace 
its tacit aspects. AI is already proving helpful in previously unassailable areas, including 
creative domains as art, design, and music, and AI programs have overcome experts in many 
complex games such as chess, go, and poker. In fact, AI has discovered game-playing strategies 
and design directions that even the best experts had not considered. These examples suggest 
that as AI enters more and more areas, its effects on employment may be complicated, as AI is 
capable of both, replacing “journeymen” levels of task, as well as augmenting them. 
Types of AI and AI Capabilities 
To better understand what causes AI to actually augment or replace work, we have to first, 
understand its characteristics, and second, to set it in an organizational context. It is common 
for firms to improve efficiency and productivity, but firms are finding that they can do much 
more when they connect AI to automation in the context of transforming their operations to 
digital ones. Many firms already depend on Web and IT environments, but digital 
transformation brings in new technologies, and treats software as a powerful, modular way to 
gain even more productivity advantages. AI acts as an amplifier on these effects. Where early 
automation was rule-based and guided by humans, one of the current goals has been to make 
automation autonomous or self-governing by way of AI.  
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The term ‘AI’ itself refers to many different kinds of technology (each suited to 
different applications). There are by now a wide variety of AI types addressed to different 
problems. Nowadays, much of the attention goes to deep learning, whose spectacular 
achievements have popularized the field as a whole. Deep learning evolved 
from artificial neural networks (ANN) (or just neural networks), one of the oldest streams of 
AI.5 ANNs and deep learning are ideal for handling large amounts of data, and their ability to 
handle more complex data and problems is increasing. Most important perhaps is that they can 
evolve with continuous data inputs to reflect their changing environments. They can discover 
new features in the data, and thus, modify the rules (governing the AI’s response to inputs) 
embedded within their structures.6  Deep learning is successful at handling data and problems 
in domains as wide-ranging as finance and medicine.7 Other AI techniques may be used for 
handling different kinds of problems. Problem domains involving human language require 
techniques that can recognize our “natural” forms of spoken language, also known as natural 
 
5 Expert systems (procedural rule-based systems) were the first AI technologies to achieve commercial success, 
but it became too time-consuming to create each new application, as the rules for each had to be encoded anew 
for each domain and application.  
6 Advances in computing power facilitated their success at processing large-scale “unstructured” data sets such as 
social media (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt, 2016; Le et al, 2013). These bottom-up forms of AI excel at pattern 
recognition with huge amounts of data, but can be problematic in situations requiring contextual and other 
inferences from general knowledge. ANNs can misclassify phenomena if they falsely attend to features that show 
up strongly in the data, but that are spurious to the features needed for the actual taxonomical classification. Some 
infamous incidents including the misrecognition of tanks in trees (when the AI recognized the cloudy day as the 
defining feature in pictures, rather than the tanks themselves), or the recognition of a sofa as an animal.  
7  Deep learning AI is used in many other sectors, such as in online retailing (e.g. Amazon and Netflix’s 
recommender systems), finance, and policing.  
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language techniques. 8  The problems encountered in domains such as service robots or 
warehouse inventory operations typically involve defining paths for robots, and may require 
some form of optimization – this is broadly classed as ‘AI planning ’.9 In general, many AI 
products such as IBM’s and Google’s flagship AIs are composites of different AI techniques.10 
By now, many if not most AI systems involve learning in response to changing environments 
and input (data), often by using deep learning or machine learning techniques, but by no means 
does this mirror what humans do when we learn. 
3. How AI and Automation will Impact on Work 
3.1. The Scope of Automation 
 
8 Natural language processing is a core technology for any AI needing to interact with humans using spoken 
communication. For other forms of human expression, such as the understanding of human expressions and 
emotions, computer and robotic vision in combination with pattern recognition techniques are used. When robots 
have to be aware of visual features in the external environment, such as is seen with in autonomous vehicles, 
computer vision is the key technology (and is itself based on image processing or pattern recognition technology). 
9 Planning, another long-standing and early application of AI, stems from operations research and mathematical 
methods used in production planning and optimization. Planning involves “the task of finding a procedural course 
of action for a declaratively described system to reach its goals while optimizing overall performance measures”. 
Planning continues to be used and developed today in robotics, by supplying the algorithms to provide more 
intelligent pathing. (IBM AI planning webpage [undated]. 
https://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/view_group.php?id=8432. [accessed November 11, 2019]). 
10 For instance, the DeepQA technology underpinning IBM’s Watson AI (that outcompeted human contestants 
on Jeopardy!) integrated natural language processing (to parse questions into more contextual form), and machine 
learning to weight the scores of candidate answers, amongst other technologies (Ferruci et al, 2013). Similarly, 
for DARPA’s Grand Challenge to develop autonomous vehicles for urban environments, the 2007 winner, 
Carnegie Mellon’s Boss, used perception, planning and behavioural software to enable it to predict traffic 
conditions, including other vehicle’s movements. 
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To understand the impact of AI, we need to consider it within the evolving complex of 
automation and work. Much of a modern firm’s operations are already located in what Brian 
Arthur coined “the second economy”: an economy of “machines” exchanging and transforming 
information in automatic processes (e.g. by making transactions seamless, instantaneous and 
therefore “frictionless”) (Arthur, 2011). The keys to this coordinated work are the software and 
algorithms that convert work processes into data and information flows.11 AI transforms this 
automation even more. We use examples of digitally transformed firms like Amazon and Tesla 
to show how AI-augmented automation affects human work, and with examples like Netflix 
and AT&T to show how machines (i.e. AI and automation) have created new functionalities 
above and beyond human capabilities – ones that add to the firms’ overall productivity.  
While past economic studies indicated that automation generally did not replace 
nonroutine manual (or cognitive) work, this was premised on technologies at the time 
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2020). In past automated systems, knowledge had to be hard-coded for 
rule-based automation to be usable, and could not be reparametrized easily to fit to different 
work environments or conditions. However, with better algorithms capable of handling 
complex data, AI techniques such as deep learning can now handle a wider variety of cognitive 
work. We should consider how Zuboff’s (1988) observation - that formerly manual work 
involving tacit knowledge was eventually replaced by automation and routinized forms of work 
– translates to the current day. It turns out that nonroutine work does not have to remain 
nonroutine in the same way, but can instead be transformed into a machine’s “routine”. The 
degree to which machines can handle tacit work depends on how much contextualization is 
needed. Machines are generally poor at recognizing context, so the narrower the domain (i.e., 
 
11 These “informating” processes were seen in the early era of automation, and not only shaped how human work 
was performed in relation to computers, but shaped how people performed their work even in relation to their 
supervisors (Zuboff, 1988). 
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the less variable the contexts and the less commonsense or broad experience needed for a 
problem), the better their performance.  
3.2. Examining the Augmentation of Tasks in a Broader Perspective 
The augmentation view suggests that AI and human work will coexist, but it does so 
by focusing on how AI increases the productivity of tasks. We argue that we need to look 
beyond the level of a task or job. By increasing the productivity of a given employee, there are 
follow-on effects at the organizational level, such as how many such jobs are needed, and how 
many routine tasks accompanying the core work are replaced. For example, the most promising 
areas for augmentation has been in the medical field, where AI applications have long been 
used to assist doctors in diagnosis. Medical imaging provides an ideal application for AI due 
to the quality and structure of the data. In radiology for instance, AI is likely to replace the 
radiologists’ task of scanning through stacks of images (usually for comparative analytical 
purposes). The work comprises a large part of what radiologists do, but is a taxing task for 
human eyes and minds: “In many ways, deep learning can mirror what trained radiologists 
do, that is, identify image parameters but also weigh up the importance of these parameters on 
the basis of other factors to arrive at a clinical decision.” (Hosny et al, 2018). In the workflow 
for medical imaging, AI can “increase efficiency, reduce errors and achieve objectives with 
minimal manual input by providing trained radiologists with pre-screened images and 
identified features.” (ibid). A recent meta-analysis showed that AI has now achieved parity 
with doctors and radiologists in the accuracy of diagnoses. In other cases, AI has been shown 
to be superior to human experts’ pattern recognition abilities and judgement. The AI’s ability 
to detect subtle features in data in algorithmically precise ways gives it an advantage over 
humans, and it is immune to inter-rater reliability errors.  
The flipside is that the AI needs massive amounts of data for training, and is unable to 
exercise ethical and other human judgments. Furthermore, the software or AI cannot combine 
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other qualitative information that doctors acquire (as from patient interviews) in diagnosing 
and recommending the correct course of action. While for the conceivable future, AI will still 
play an assisting or supporting role (Davis, 2019), one scenario suggests that the increase in 
efficiency of scanning will cause less radiologists to be needed. Debate has raged over whether 
AI will displace radiological and other medical jobs, and medical schools have seen drops in 
enrolment for the specialization of radiology. One health AI firm’s CEO put it as a 
complementary effect: “radiologists using AI will replace those who do not (use it).” (De La 
Garza, 2020). In this augmentation view, the AI actually increases the productivity of the 
higher skilled (tacit) work, and offloads the lower skilled tasks onto the AI. While overall, this 
can correspond to less work being done by humans, the actual impact on employment is likely 
to vary according to the organization’s workload. If the doctors are overworked and operating 
in resourced-constrained environments, such as in the UK’s National Health Service, the AI’s 
use might not impact on their employment, but serves an assistive role. If the hospital is 
organized as a production line and trust is placed in the algorithms to make decisions which 
are then communicated to the patient with a minimum of the specialist’s input, fewer 
radiological specialists may be needed (Kaplan, 2015; Reardon, 2019).  
3.3. Characteristics of AI-Augmented Automation in Digitally Transformed Firms  
To address our thesis that AI further augments automation, we need to grapple with a second 
thesis that is in some ways more extreme: A digitally-transformed firm (or one that has almost 
all its operating capabilities in software) invokes the modularization of human work, then, 
coupled with technological progress, the modularized tasks may eventually face replacement. 
We further presume that in order to replace human work, the machines do not need to think in 
similar ways to humans, so long as their output matches the desirability of human-made outputs. 
To understand this, note Bezos’ view of AI as the key to Amazon’s growth across business 
functions: "much of what we do with machine learning happens beneath the surface. Machine 
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learning drives our algorithms for demand forecasting, product search ranking, product and 
deals recommendations, merchandising placements, fraud detection, translations, and much 
more. Though less visible, much of the impact of machine learning will be of this type – quietly 
but meaningfully improving core operations" (Bezos, 2017). For example, a key function in 
firms like Amazon and Netflix with an online presence is the recommender system, which 
recommends content to users. These systems are the product of years of applied research into 
algorithms and models, now used for recognizing patterns in consumer preferences.12 At heart, 
these systems involve the acquisition and analysis of continuous external data streams from 
customers’ interactions with services. Software supports much of this automation and helps to 
integrate or link disparate systems. In the case of Amazon, the consumption data are 
electronically linked to other systems such as inventory and pricing. Thus, digital technologies 
transforms not only enterprises focused on digital services and content, but also gives 
enterprises the digital means to organize themselves and to connect to real world supply chains. 
AI and Self-Governing Capability  
One of the distinguishing features of AI is it provides a self-governing capability to itself and 
to automation in general. This was seen in the area of self-driving vehicles, referred to as an 
“autonomous intelligence”, but has not been seen as much in other sectors yet (Garbuio and 
Lin, 2019). Whereas a traditional AI might regulate a system within pre-defined parameter 
ranges (much as a thermostat might), the nature of AI is changing, and modern kinds of AI 
such as deep learning can discover new features, which allows for an even wider range of 
 
12 Netflix’s recommender system (in use since before 2005) also involves generating new models based on 
hypotheses of customer behavior, training the algorithms on historical data, making predictive estimates, and 
engaging in experiments to test the new algorithms against older ones (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt, 2016). Ultimately, 
these systems serve to make firms more efficient and productive. By combining analytics and models, Amazon 
and other firms create wholly new functions that do not have human equivalents in work.  
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operation. A second case involves communications network governance. AT&T had already 
automated its communications network’s operations with rudimentary means of identifying 
breakdowns in the communications network, and these even autonomously assisted in repairs 
and rerouting traffic. In those systems, AI is embedded in what is termed a “software defined 
network”, responding to a larger variety of different problem situations, identifying and solving 
failures, and conducting more complicated decision-making. This rudimentary intelligence 
governs network operations by pre-programmed (by humans) responses, what AT&T terms 
“policies”, but AI capability continues to increase along with the network’s degree of autonomy 
and “decision-making”. As a leader in the practice notes: “The real magic will happen when 
the AI has done this many times and keeps getting better at making predictions. It could even 
modify policies over time” (Larson, 2016). In general, even though an automated system may 
be independently reacting and to operational conditions, human engineers are still needed for 
developing new models, and many current AI systems still operate according to prior-defined 
models of consumer behavior.  In Amazon, it is the human developers which develop new 
insights on consumer preferences and algorithmic research which supports the creation of new 
conceptual models. However, the technology of of deep learning has the potential to do more. 
Given enough data, it can extract “new” features in the data, and so could create new models 
(although currently, that still happens with human help). 
Automation as Monitoring and Controlling Human Work 
One area that business programs historically train for is that of general management. Managers 
historically undertook monitoring, coordination and control functions for the workforce, and 
many jobs in contemporary firms are still of this type. Under certain scenarios, AI could have 
far-reaching implications for middle management employment. During the first era of 
automation, management was already being separated from the workforce by information 
technology (Zuboff, 1988), but management itself has steadily become routine work. In highly 
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automated organizations, the remaining management functions involving the oversight of work 
are increasingly augmented by and patrolled by technology, with AI playing an increasing role 
as the monitoring and controlling “intelligence”.  
One corporate function that largely hinges on measurement and performance evaluation 
has been human resources management (HRM). With the advent of analytics, the application 
of AI becomes a natural next step. Even though humans still perform the bulk of certain tasks 
such as new employee orientation and training, many HRM activities such as recruitment, 
training and assessment increasingly take digital forms (e.g. simulation and gamification in 
training exercises). AI is already available for automating certain HRM tasks, but the next step 
will be the connection of assessment systems to AI, providing an extremely granular measure 
of task work.13 While many firms had not yet used analytics in human resources (22% by one 
survey [Tambe et al., 2019]), an Amazon example shows how far this vision of HRM can be 
realized. Amazon effectively reshaped HRM by integrating the task of employee measurement 
into a broader automated system. Documents from a recent court case revealed that “Amazon’s 
system tracks the rates of each associate’s productivity and automatically generates any 
warnings or terminations regarding quality or productivity without input from supervisors.” 
(Carey, 2018). In bypassing the traditional HRM function and even supervisors, the AI removes 
managerial oversight, creating a system that many may consider onerous.14 This machine-led 
 
13 Some firms also offer blockchain solutions that allow for the fine-tuned management of human resources (PwC 
2017). It is a short step further for such systems to capture and measure employee performance in even more 
automated ways. Invariably, more data also means more oversight of employees’ activities. 
14 Amazon’s law firm revealed how the system is used, in a recent court case over one employee (of several 
hundred fired in a given year from an Amazon facility in Baltimore) Lecher, C. (2019). How Amazon 
automatically tracks and fires warehouse workers for ‘productivity’, The Verge, April 25, 2019. 
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manner of coordination involves the AI in not only analysis, but also “planning” and optimizing 
performance. The speeds at which AI functions are now so much faster than humans that 
humans are increasingly “coordinated” within its automated workflow. All of this places limits 
on human agency, and creates a far greater degree of “automated” intrusiveness into employees’ 
lives and rights than ever before (Tambe et al, 2019).  
The Modularization of Work, Deskilling, and Replacement 
The automation of discrete corporate functions is only a first step in the evolution towards the 
larger-scale use of automation in digitally transformed firms. A key point we will incorporate 
later is the idea that the modularization of work tasks will help facilitate automation across the 
broader organization. When manufacturing sectors were automated, at least three classes of 
tasks typically remain: manual tasks involving higher dexterity than computers can achieve, 
the human operation of computer controls via interfaces (to coordinate the new production 
system), and intellectual work that involves analytical and developmental activities (e.g. 
software development). As we will show, in the end, advancements in robotic vision and 
robotic manipulation will lead to more and more absorption of the first - the manual task work. 
The second – computer interface operation - is akin to the “deskilling” situations described 
earlier by Zuboff and other scholars. The augmentation view espouses that the third could 
expand, but as we will show later, under a different set of assumptions, even higher skilled 
(typically highly professionalized) work could be downsized.  
The Replacement of Modularized Work 
Tesla’s experience is illustrative of the challenges of automating manual tasks. Tesla sought to 
fully automate its Model 3’s factory to offset the costs and disadvantages to its costly product 
model, but the attempt failed: “(the) robotic vision… the assembly line robots just couldn’t 
 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/25/18516004/amazon-warehouse-fulfillment-centers-productivity-firing-
terminations (accessed November 15, 2019)  
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deal with unexpected orientations of objects like nuts and bolts, or complicated maneuvering 
between the car frame. Every such issue would cause the assembly line to stop. In the end, it 
was far easier to substitute humans for robots in many assembly situations.” (Kottenstette, 
2019). It can be seen that the automated systems in Amazon’s warehouses and Tesla’s factories 
embed the remaining human work as circumscribed tasks in the overall work flow. We argue 
that this modularizing or circumscribing of tasks is a necessary prelude to their replacement by 
machines. In Amazon, the remaining manual work for humans to do consists of the “pickers” 
(of items off the shelves), the “stowers” (who replenish inventory on the shelves), and the 
“packers” (of boxes), where the pickers only act when the machines bring work to them. 
Baldwin’s (2008) concept of modularity guides our interpretation of what seems to be 
happening: In modularity theory, a module is a group of elements—in this case, tasks—that 
are highly interdependent on one another, but only minimally dependent on what happens in 
other modules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000: 63). By definition, modules are separated from one 
another by thin crossing points—in Simon’s (1962) terminology, they are “near decomposable.” 
Essentially, by routinizing, then modularizing work, the digitally transformed firms are 
creating ‘thin crossing points’ between the modules of work – that is, clear cut interfaces 
between the circumscribed tasks that humans perform, and the wider automated workflow. 
Once the work tasks are circumscribed as such, they are not only measurable by automated 
means; the modularized tasks themselves are also more easily posed as technical problems for 
computer scientists and roboticists to solve, further increasing the prospect of more 
replacement of work.  
Deskilling in the Modern Era and Business Imperatives 
We have argued that digitally transforming firms will generally replace jobs with AI as part of 
a wider move to routinization and automation. AI may have a more transformative effect by 
automating work that has been circumscribed and modularized. In modern operations such as 
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Amazon’s and Tesla’s, robots are extensively employed in automated systems, and humans are 
mainly employed to monitor their operations or to undertake actions that the robots cannot 
reliably perform. However, the human work is subsumed to the automated system, and 
increasingly, a machine intelligence’s coordination and control, not unlike the manner seen 
with Chaplin’s hapless worker in Modern Times. While workers still do the picking operations, 
or the manual work of identifying exceptions and errors, this is only because the combination 
of human senses, skills and ability to contextualize circumstances are still superior to the 
machines’.15 However, due to their superior information processing capability, machines have 
now taken over the analytical “thinking” parts of the work. With the exception of error 
identification, most of the remaining work of picking and sorting is routine manual labor, but 
since this is decoupled from the thinking and decision-making involving what to do (including 
after or before the activity), we could say that deskilling is at work. Another example of 
deskilling and AI replacement is seen in digital media firms such as Facebook or YouTube. 
These businesses require the screening of user-generated content for sensitive material. While 
this appears to require cognitive abilities and knowledge, it can also be framed as the 
identification of exceptions amongst repeated patterns. Recently, after office shutdowns 
occurring from the COVID-19 virus, the large social media firms quickly switched away from 
their human workforces to AI programs, illustrating the ease of replacing humans, and the 
potential of AI. More recently, Microsoft has also replaced the human journalists responsible 
for curating content on their MSNBC website with AI (Waterson, 2020). Recent advances in 
human-like text creation by the GPT-3 technology has also caught the journalism world’s 
attention. 
 
15 For instance, Amazon still needs human pickers because they can recognize exceptions that computer vision 
still cannot comprehend (unless it has a knowledge base of all such exceptions as well as patterns to match them). 
For instance, a human can recognize when a container is leaking fluids, whereas a machine might not be able to. 
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Comparing Human and Machine Ways of Thinking 
The incessant advances in AI are causing the replacement of one human cognitive function 
after another. Many aspects of human work still require reasoning and other faculties, and AI 
cannot replace this human thinking. We are still far better than machines at acquiring and 
retrieving contextual knowledge, and many of our work processes still occur in idiosyncratic 
manner. However, this assumes that the machine has to duplicate our ways of working in order 
to replace humans. The computing paradigm essentially revolves around information 
processing, and great strides have been made on information acquisition, processing and 
contextualization for narrow domains. Machines can acquire information and process it at 
incredible speeds, and the application of the combination of sheer brute force computing with 
AI to various expert domains (such as autonomous vehicles) has proven a powerful 
combination. General human thinking processes have been more difficult for machines to 
replicate, and represent a challenge to AI experts attempting to create an ‘artificial general 
intelligence’. One challenge to AI to replicate is the human ability to reason causally, which 
underlies the human basis for decision-making. While earlier generations of deep learning were 
initially only capable of modelling correlations, and not causal reasoning, recent theoretical 
developments in computer science have derived causal inferences from statistical data, and 
these are already being embedded in applications.16 Another area is our human means of verbal 
 
16 The ability is to reason casually is potentially important, since causality is an important component to other 
forms of human thinking, including reasoning and scientific thinking. Causality is typically captured in branches 
of AI that use forms of knowledge representation to capture the structure of knowledge within a domain, e.g. 
predicate logic and knowledge graphs (based on mathematical graph theory). Commercial AI programs such as 
IBM’s Watson store and retrieve knowledge in knowledge graphs, and conduct their reasoning with these and the 
help of other kinds of AI techniques. One of the challenges with ANN-based AI is that it captures data as 
correlations. A traditional ANN classifies patterns in the data, but the patterns are organized in relation to each 
other in spatial (e.g. vector) terms. In contrast, humans model the world, however, with causal inferences. The 
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and non-verbal communication. In areas like customer-facing work, the natural spoken 
language and facial expressions are critical means of communication., With advances in 
algorithms and sufficient brute force in computing, AI can theoretically replace if not supersede 
humans at many customer-facing and business decision-making tasks. 17  AI is not only 
replacing routinize work, but also non-routine human work. The AI does not need to replicate 
our thinking exactly in order to do better than us (Susskind and Susskind 2015). It just needs 
to create a similar output in a faster, more productive manner than humans. The remaining 
areas where humans still function better than machines are ones that involve the perception, 
acquisition, and processing of experiential and contextual knowledge. Human senses and 
sense-making of experiences are not replicable by any machines. The problem is, in the 
automated organization, these areas may be becoming ever smaller areas of work.  
As noted earlier, it is a common expectation that digital transformation will increase 
the demand for highly-skilled technical professionals in areas like software and design (Seibel 
2019). The augmentation view also suggests that jobs will require employees to learn new AI 
tools. Largely digital enterprises such as AirBnB, also require creative work such as design, 
but as noted earlier, these are not the typical transition paths for workers previously performing 
in the manual work lost to automation. As we show next, the economies of scale and scope 
 
principles have been formulated by the computer scientist Judea Pearle and in part implemented in DoWhy, a 
casual inference software library established by Microsoft. The start-up Inguo now applies such reasoning in 
its deep learning algorithms.  
17 For instance, gesture recognition technologies and ontologies for human emotions now help AI applications to 
recognize human emotional and behavioral states from human facial expressions and body movements 
respectively. Previous generations of natural language processing (NLP) AI could not capture natural ways of 
communicating, but that is changing. NLP advances are helping make sense of human expressions of language. 
To capture even wider-spaced contexts, systems such as IBM’s Watson may combine NLP and knowledge graph 
ontologies. 
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arising from automation may reduce the numbers of technical personnel needed. Furthermore, 
there is an additional follow-on effect on employment as the new technologies grow more 
powerful, and as competitive advantages accrue to such automated firms.  
4. Trends and the AI-Augmented Dynamics of Automation  
Effects of Combining Technologies 
AI’s impact on work can have even broader effects over time, as the automated organizations 
restructure their work internally, and gain advantages in external competition. The first gains 
will come about from further technological recombination between AI and three other 
technologies: analytics (expanding on what was discussed earlier), cloud computing, and the 
Internet of Things (IoT). Cloud computing has been an important means for firms to scale their 
computing capability (Siebel, 2019). Firms acquire the needed computing capability through 
the cloud service provider only as their needs increase.18 Hosting the firms’ computing with 
the cloud service provider removes unnecessary hardware and maintenance costs from the 
firms, and provides more reliability and scalability given the firms’ reduced responsibilities. 
Hosting on the cloud also allows smaller firms to adopt AI more easily (Garbuio and Lin, 2019). 
However, the costs and carbon emissions of training AI are not insignificant (assuming 
electricity from fossil fuels) (Schwartz et al., 2019).19 A second disruptor - the Internet of 
 
18 While cloud computing benefits firms by making their IT operations more cost-effective, in general, the more 
a firm becomes software-based, the more it can become cloud-based. Seibel refers to five benefits to 
clients: Infinite capacity (i.e., resources), On-demand self-service, where users obtain computing resources as 
needed with ease, broad access (to resources), resource pooling, and rapid elasticity (resources being easily scaled 
up or down with the user’s changes in demand).  
19 It has been estimated in recent research that training a large off the shelf deep learning AI (a representative 
called the Linguistically- Informed Self-Attention model) takes about $9870 worth of electricity to train (Schwartz 
et al, 2019). This is about 10.6 years’ worth of electricity at a Tesla model 3’s electricity cost (assuming a full 
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Things – refers to the trend to imbue equipment (e.g. Internet-accessible devices) with 
intelligence (Siebel, 2019). While only some consumer goods manufacturers have embedded 
IoT technology, IoT is becoming more common in complex products such as industrial 
machinery, infrastructure, and vehicles. The technology’s potential is not fully realized, as the 
data is sometimes generated faster than firms can manage. IoT devices involve not only sensors 
and monitoring devices but also small-scale computing devices, making it possible not only 
for firms to know about the usage of their products on a continuous basis, but also for 
equipment to become more “intelligent”, attaining some self-governing capability. In the case 
of consumer goods, the users’ behaviors are tracked, giving firms the ability to discern future 
opportunities on potential consumer needs. Data can also help firms to know about device 
usage and failure patterns. Like aircraft engine manufacturers and other operators of complex 
machinery, Caterpillar embeds IoT in their construction equipment to enable a ‘predictive 
maintenance’, saving millions of dollars each year. These improve performance and efficiency 
by removing much of the manual work needed to inspect engines and other equipment each 
year.  
While cloud computing facilitates AIs’ manipulation of data, IoT is an additional 
accelerator to this as it pumps vast amounts of data into the evaluating AI or other systems.20 
Data is already sent to manufacturers on their equipment’s real-time operations in the field. A 
 
charge each week). This is not even counting the cloud computing costs, which run anywhere from $103,000 to 
$350,000 for the same set of models. 
20 Start-ups now also operate their robots and peripherals from the cloud (that is, with their intelligence and 
software hosted on cloud resources), which removes the need for onboard hardware. This reduces the individual 
costs of robots, and make it easier for the robotics start-up to get traction in the market, and to service their 
customers (author’s conversation with founder of a robotics start-up). Eventually, the lower cost per robot can 
encourage even more market penetration. 
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modern passenger plane’s engine has numerous sensors sending data from the plane’s 
communication systems back to the manufacturer for predictive (preventive) maintenance. A 
port’s cranes will have hundreds of sensors gathering information on each crane and storing it 
for troubleshooting purposes.21 The more sophisticated of systems may allow for a continuous 
processing of the data as it arrives, so as to improve the system’s performance on the fly. An 
example of this combination of IoT and AI and interchange of information between individual 
units and the fleet are Tesla’s vehicles. Tesla states: Our networks learn from the most 
complicated and diverse scenarios in the world, iteratively sourced from our fleet of nearly 1M 
vehicles in real time.22 The learning and propagation of information on a global (i.e. fleet-wide) 
scale couples the notions of self-governance and system-level governance together. 
What Underlies AI Scaling and Experimentation: Software, Platforms and Models 
The automation of an enterprise or a facility such as Amazon’s is facilitated by digital platforms. 
Platforms are usually based in software, but there are distinct features of the software platforms 
that imbue a digitally transformed firm with economic advantages (AirBnB, Uber and other 
platform firms being the obvious examples). The platforms’ software-based characteristics that 
support the AI’s augmentation of automation are: their ability to coordinate and automate work; 
their enabling of firms to run large numbers of experiments at scale; and their operating basis 
being in models (also a form of modularity). With regards to the first, the increasing number 
of platforms within a digitally transformed firm can cause challenges in their integration, 
especially if the automation is to become seamless. Firms will invariably seek to architect their 
 
21 Author’s conversation with lead data scientist for a container port. 
22 The AI then processes the data collected from the fleet as follows: A full build of Autopilot neural networks 
involves 48 networks that take 70,000 GPU hours to train. Together, they output 1,000 distinct tensors 
(predictions) at each timestep. https://www.tesla.com/autopilotAI, Tesla Autopilot microsite (Accessed April 8, 
2020). 
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systems (i.e., platforms) to fit together by modular and other means. In AT&T, as multiple 
platforms came into being – one for each specialized function – the head of AT&T’s 
development work noted, “I can’t just keep doing this one (i.e. platform) at a time. We need a 
foundation,” said Mazin Gilbert. The carrier... (had) been using AI for decades in areas like 
call-center automation but developed it for each use as they came along. Now AT&T is pouring 
its AI smarts into a one platform that can be used with multiple applications… which the carrier 
built so it could roll out new services more quickly and efficiently” (Larson, 2016). 
The second platform characteristic, their experimental ability, allows firms to launch 
large numbers of experimental forays into markets, such as new digital content and marketing 
campaigns. It is common for Web-based and software firms to do A/B testing, that is, to run 
controlled trials of design interventions against one another. Firms like Amazon conduct (or in 
the case of Facebook, allow the conduct of) many more experiments daily on their websites, 
before rolling them out across multiple geographic locations. Firms like Amazon runs many 
thousands of e-commerce experiments over the course of a year on its platforms, making their 
platforms continuously running test beds. On Facebook, a trial can involve many different 
versions of an advertisement being tested on different segments of customers, each using 
different word choices and means of conveying the message. The effectiveness of these 
different word combinations can be validated by the ways in which users engage with “clicks” 
and “eye contact” (i.e., length of time spent on a page).23 It is relatively easy to run large-scale 
experiments by automating the permutation of text, and for AI to be applied to analyzing the 
patterns in responses. In general, AI can process large amounts of statistical data - sometimes 
sparsely distributed across many seemingly unrelated dimensions - in ways humans cannot 
fathom. AI applications include financial institutions’ tracking of illegal financial activity by 
 
23 The example was provided to an author by the director of an insurance company’s innovation lab. 
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the processing of data - such as typical and atypical credit card uses for an individual and class 
of user – to detect unusual patterns of behavior.24 As a predictive maintenance manager at 
Caterpillar Marine notes, “There are relationships between pieces of data that the human eye 
just can’t see – relationships about relationships about relationships (Marr, 2017).” 
Technically, AI is represented as models or algorithms in software. Unlike past 
statistical models, big data models capture a much more complete representation of the entire 
problem-solution situation. For instance, Netflix captures every part of a user’s online 
behaviour using the algorithms in its recommender system. Netflix also relies on positive 
feedback (recommending users’ preferences to other similar users), and rolls the algorithms 
out globally.25 Seibel describes yet another notion of model: that of the conception of software 
as a model-driven architecture (representing an “abstraction layer to simplify the programming 
problem”). He decribes how this has driven productivity in software production: “a model-
driven architecture decreases the cost and complexity of designing, developing, testing, 
provisioning, maintaining, and operating an application by as much as 100 times or more.” 
(Seibel, 2019, pp 182-183). In fact, this conception of models in software is a manifestation of 
the earlier-discussed modularity. Modularity was at the heart of a firm’s ability to reduce 
human work to problems that are solvable by machines. But software modularity also promotes 
recombination and reuse – two patterns of technological organizing that promote the productive 
use of software, and allows for economies of scope across different uses of the software.  
In summary, software platforms not only possess economies of scale and scope, they 
power digital transformation by increasing the scope of automation across the entire 
organization. We will show that the integration of software, algorithms and automation with 
 
24 Based on an interview with lead member of a multinational bank’s credit data group. 
25 Netflix for instance uses a set of algorithms based on statistical techniques and machine learning to tag each 
user’s search patterns (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt, 2016). 
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AI fosters further advantages, and consequently, increasing returns (up to a point). While this 
complex of organizational activity augments and accelerates the human work modularly 
embedded within it, will this automated complex also increasingly displace the “natural“ ways 
in which humans coordinate and do their work? The organization of human intellectual work 
is traditionally oriented around task coordination – something AI is adept at doing precisely –
but also around the need to reconcile - via human means of communication - rich and differing 
views of the world - different ways of thinking about the world, or ‘thought worlds’ as it were. 
This leads to the follow-on question: If AI replaces all this human work, what do organizations 
lose out on? 
The Shifting Character of Employment 
We have laid out a theoretical picture of how firms accrue advantages from a more technical 
basis. To address the potential employment effects in digitally transforming firms, we examine 
a vignette. In Amazon, not only analysts and engineers, but also manual labor, were the recent 
job categories with the highest demand. However, the surge in AI and robotics and the 
modularizing of work makes each manual skill ripe for replacement on a modular, skill-by-
skill, basis. Where humans once boxed and loaded pallets and carts, Kiva robots now work 
autonomously, and are monitored only for exceptions (Simon, 2020). Amazon aims to 
automate carts and vehicles to ever greater degrees, and recently acquired Canvas Technology, 
a start-up specializing in autonomous carts (as well as investing in an autonomous vehicles 
start-up); similarly Amazon just introduced carton packing and wrapping robots in select 
facilities (Wiggers, 2019). As one observer noted, “start-ups and researchers are scrambling 
to overcome the many remaining technical obstacles. Amazon even sponsors an annual contest 
to encourage more innovation in the category.” (Wingfield, 2017). The incentives of the 
computer and engineering sciences and robotics firms, then, are to “solve” all the remaining 
manual work as “hard” technological problems.  
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While Amazon retrains workers to the new work, this work essentially involves 
following instructions on screens to manage the robots, or to react to exceptions (in ways that 
are also procedural in nature), in effect acting as a check on the robots’ work. The history of 
automation involves gradual routinization followed by technological advancement and 
replacement or leveraging on fewer and fewer employees.26 This may occur in other workplace 
settings as well. Looking towards the future, recent research that matched AI patents to job 
descriptions also suggests that some parts of the remaining white collar work – ones that are 
better paid and that require better educated workforces - are now some of the most at risk of 
being replaced (Muro et al., 2019).  
Dynamics in the Marketplace: The Amazon Effect 
The dynamic effect commonly observed is that e-commerce and other digitally transformed 
business models creating increasing returns via the various technological scaling mechanisms 
they use, often at zero to low marginal costs. The advantages of operating digitally allows them 
to outcompete conventional retailers and enterprises, both small and large, and causes an 
additional negative impact to overall employment. The most well-known example was of 
bookstores, which declined throughout the 1990s, but the effect also occurring in other sectors, 
retail and otherwise (e.g. Blockbuster at the expense of Netflix, Kodak at the expense of digital 
photography). This has not escaped policy-makers’ attention: “Steven Mnuchin, the Treasury 
Secretary, declared that Amazon has “destroyed the retail industry across the United States.”” 
(Duhigg, 2019). Conventional firms’ employees suffer from pressure on wages, as witnessed 
by firms such as Uber intruding into the taxi companies’ business. The counter argument used 
by Amazon has been to point to its tremendous growth in hiring employees. A similar 
perspective is raised by the augmentation view. Observers like Barro and Davenport (2019) 
 
26 Susskind and Susskind (2015) lay out a means for understanding how the organization of work changed over 
time in the legal, medical and educational professions.  
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use the term ‘Partners in Innovation’, while robotics uses the term “cobots” to describe systems 
of robots and humans working together. However, when we account for Amazon’s expansion 
by examining other areas of the economy, a mixed picture emerges. A census count of 
employees in the books, periodicals and music stores retail sector show a decline in 
employment from 201,445 in 2002 to 97,904 in 2012 (the latest), the period when Amazon was 
showing early exponential growth.27 An oft cited Amazon statistic is that they created 300,000 
jobs in the several years’ span since the introduction of robots in 2012 (Barro and Davenport, 
2019). Simultaneously, however, Amazon also doubled the number of its robots from 100,000 
to 200,000 in just one year –consisting largely of new systems that automated manual tasks. 
From these, Amazon was able to amortize the cost of just two new robot types in less than two 
years (Wiggers, 2019).  
As the newer technologies being applied in Amazon continue to feed productivity 
increases across its various business, they cause employment per unit of value created to 
eventually decrease. As Amazon grows, it adds new business lines to its existing operations, 
creating competitive pressures on enterprises in other sectors of the economy. Facing this 
competitive situation, other companies will feel the need to engage in this arms race, where 
“unless companies are willing to commit resources to AI technologies, they risk falling behind 
competitors in both productivity and quality.” (Barro and Davenport, 2019, p. 25). This 
organizational AI arms race raises productivity across the board, causing further employment 
losses in those sectors.  
The Collapse of Barriers to Adoption 
 
27 Firm statistics obtained from the US census: https://www.census.gov, https://data.census.gov (Accessed April 
6, 2020). Amazon statistics obtained from Amazon Fulfillment Center microsite and Statista.com. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266282/annual-net-revenue-of-amazoncom/ (Accessed April 6, 2020); 
Amazon staff (undated). 
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As with any other innovation, a number of factors hold back the adoption of digital innovations, 
including their cost relative to low wage employees, their unproven nature, and general 
corporate inertia (including that of middle managers). Some consumers did not give up on 
shopping in person due to switching costs, as they could not accept the behavioral adjustments 
needed. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has brought down many of these barriers, including 
the psychological (Corkery and Gelles, 2020). By necessity, large parts of commerce in many 
countries had to be conducted via online delivery services. The necessity of these alternative 
means of commerce inculcates new behaviors in consumers that may be hard to switch back 
from. Given how routine job types never recovered from economic shocks in the past 
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2020), the COVID-19 downturn may also induce businesses to readjust 
permanently, reducing or replacing jobs with technology forever, at the very least, to avoid 
carrying high employee costs (Ovide, 2020).   
Sources of Augmented Firms’ Economies of Scope and Scale  
Part of what we term ‘digitally transformed’ enterprises has also been recently referred to as 
“AI factories” (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2020). The term describes scalable business models with 
a basis in algorithms and analytics, from which emanate economies of scale and scope. Our 
argument is that digitally transformed firms also have these same economic features, but rather 
than having the advantage resting on a specific analytics function within the firm, we have been 
describing a broader complex of AI-augmented automation that integrates and streamlines 
many work activities, and especially on the operations side of firms. The economies of scale 
and scope in our model come from treating work modularly, reusing the modules where 
possible, and if necessary (to the firm), replacing the “modules” of work with automation. 
Since business model changes are implemented in software, this allows digital services to be 
added with relative ease, and facilitates rapid scaling and changes. Digital platforms also 
provide an experimental ability that can be scaled quickly and that allows for rapid adjustments. 
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This has the ability to move quickly from exploring to exploiting, i.e., that allows rapid scaled-
up rollouts. The platforms can automate many business activities, including even the 
automation process itself! Amazon’s automation of its intelligent machine implementation is a 
case in point: “RoboMaker, the company’s cloud robotics service (is) designed to expedite 
developing, testing, and deploying intelligent machines at scale” (Wiggers, 2019).  
Digitally transformed firms have inherent economies of scope, in part because digital 
goods and content can be massively personalized to consumers as their online behaviors are 
captured. Amazon’s recommender system alone has been described as helping Amazon in 
“building a store for every customer” (Smith and Linden, 2017) - a phrase reflecting the 
economies of scope. Huge data flows result from IoT technology acquiring data from sensors, 
remote cameras and drones, as well as customer interactions on the Web. AI can be applied to 
these in order to develop characterizations of user behaviors and preferences with great 
granularity, as well as the devisement of and rolling out of services to address these.  
To reiterate, the software-based modularity at the heart of digitally transformed firms 
promotes reuse and interchangeability (for ease of recombination) of processes and services. 
This allows additional products and services to be added at lower marginal costs, garnering 
further economies of scale and scope. To Amazon, it is less material whether it is selling a book 
or a can of food, since its operations are organized as information. Many decisions are 
traditionally the purview of hierarchically-organized chains of command – such as pricing, 
logistics (e.g. instructions to suppliers), and planning. Automation or even partial automation 
in digital environments can cause these to become more efficiently conveyed and allow ease 
of updating.  
Employment Implications of the Ongoing Dynamics of Digital Transformation 
To understand the changes to employment in digitally transformed firms, we look at the 
changing character of work, focusing on the development (of product and business) activities 
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as a case in point. Organizational work is traditionally classified as exploratory or exploitative, 
but exploitative work tends to be routinized, raising its risk of being automated. When 
organizations digitally transform, they may revisit how they innovate. They may explore more, 
and engage in a mode of exploring tied to a strong experimental mindset. Typical exploitation 
forms of development may include the refinement of existing product lines, while exploration 
activities include the design and launch of new products. However, the experimental nature of 
digitally transformed organizations involving digital products and services blurs the line 
between exploration and exploitation. The embedding of key processes in software and in the 
cloud allows exploration by experiments. These may be followed up by the rapid scaling up in 
an “exploitation” phase, but with less costly or irretrievable commitments. While potential 
replacement effects (on employment) are commonly discussed for operational activities (e.g. 
the displacement of drivers by self-driving cars), product and business development work can 
be presumed to require more profound and multivariegated types of thinking - ones requiring 
human contextualization of action. The amount of ‘multivariegated’ work remaining may 
depend on how much firms and technology augment the work, and how automatable and 
scalable the work becomes. The workforce for development activities in digitally transformed 
firms consists of highly-skilled employees like programmers, analysts and data scientists. 
However, such development teams may also be smaller in size, with one estimate noting that 
with current advances in software, development teams for creating new models and platforms 
could be as small as a few engineers and scientists (Seibel, 2019).28  
Another factor that dictates whether development work is replaced is that large parts of 
it still fundamentally involves human forms of interaction and knowledge creation. The degree 
 
28 Seibel notes that with a model-driven (modularized) architecture, “small teams of between three and five 
software engineers and data scientists… can develop production AI and IoT applications in as little as 10 weeks” 
(Seibel, 2019, pp 49-50).  
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to which this exploratory work can be replaced depends on the circumstances of the work in 
question. Tasks such as business or market development involve a search for business 
opportunities, partly achieved through human interaction with customers and vendors on rich 
contexts (e.g. customer-specific contexts). While human sensemaking is not replaceable by 
digital means, digitally transformed firms may substitute the function of a more unstructured 
search with digital forms of search grounded in data (e.g. e-commerce firms’ use of digital 
channels and analytics). In the future, it is also possible for automated searches to occur with 
software agents acting as intermediaries between the firms. In a traditional firm, many activities 
in product development and marketing also involve inter-departmental interactions. 
Interactions and task handoffs can be imprecise, requiring communication to reconcile different 
perspectives. However, these different perspectives or ‘thought worlds’ can also be enriching 
if they shed different kinds of light on ill-formulated or unsolved problems. The question is 
whether the digital replacements are as effective as these traditional ways of working, or are 
augmentative (and hence, replacing of some of the work). In a similar way, for customer-facing 
work, it is well-known that the human touch may still be valued by customers in areas where 
personal services and neighborhood stores are involved, but as we have seen, e-commerce and 
digital interfaces are steadily eroding these organizational forms. Finally, on the most creative 
end, development activities such as design benefits from human senses and abilities. Creativity, 
synthesis and sensemaking are still needed to create new products and experiences. Employees 
may be required to have superior capabilities at synthesizing new knowledge, depth of 
knowledge, and the ability to explore interstitial areas. The trouble is, even if these human 
qualities are prized, they are also challenging for many employees to acquire. They are also 
increasingly possible to augment and scale. 
5. Conclusion 
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Our goal was to better inform the replacement and augmentation debate by examining it from 
the broader perspective of AI’s augmentation of automation. While in prior eras of automation, 
the loss of employment to automation was offset by the growth of new sectors and jobs, this 
also involved a loss of routinized, middle-skilled work, and a polarization of jobs into high and 
low skilled ones. In an era of AI-augmented automation, we suggest that this imbalance may 
be further aggravated. We examined digitally transformed firms and developments in AI to 
help articulate an argument for the further replacement of work. Essentially, AI helps 
automation to become self-governing, even while a broader automation of firms’ work 
processes occurs. Firms can more easily replace modularized work, and the modularizing of 
nonroutine work makes them more tractable (and solvable) as new AI problems. Furthermore, 
given that the remaining manual work essentially involves basic cognitive functions such as 
pattern recognition, and/or manual dexterity, this eliminates any wage premium accruable from 
training, and might be considered as a form of deskilling. These trends may bode poorly for 
employment. At one extreme, this has led to onerous closed-loop systems that automate the 
monitoring, assessment and even firing, of human resources. Ford (2015) further notes that the 
structure of employment could be very distorted, with very few at “the top” gaining the 
remaining (most intellectual of) work. Furthermore, the combination of AI with analytics and 
technologies such as cloud computing and IoT, in conjunction with the basis of these digitally 
transformed organizations in software, platforms and models, provide digitally transformed 
firms with economies of scale and scope over traditional non-AI using firms, putting further 
pressure on these other firms to  transform themselves. We have noted certain conditions under 
which cognitive human work is preservable, these being ones where the richness of knowledge 
context and complex human interactions remains important to firms. Replacement will thus 
have a ceiling until critical technical advances are made. 
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The societal implications of this scenario are profound. If AI-induced automation 
replaces more and more work, and much of the remaining work is concentrated into a smaller, 
highly technical workforce, there will be a need for policy to ensure jobs for sustainable 
livelihoods. Governments, firms and scholars should to come together to engage firms in 
thinking of new models of socially-minded production, and to consider social protections. This 
also raises implications for business school education. We still largely teach computable forms 
of analysis as a holdover from the training of workforces for corporations organized for mass 
production. We need to think about how business models affect work, and we do not educate 
enough on how to use new technologies to promote sustainable forms of work, and livelihoods.  
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